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INVOLUNTARY HOSPITALIZATION OF THE MENTALLY ILL
UNDER FLORIDA'S BAKER ACT: PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS AND THE ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY
It must be kept in mind that appellant is not charged with a crime and
is not so incarcerated. He is being restrained of his liberty in that he is
not free to come and go at will, but such restraint is not in the way of
punishment but for his own protection and welfare as well as for the
benefit of society. Such loss of liberty is not such liberty as is within the
meaning of the constitutional provision that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."'
This traditional view of the commitment of the mentally ill has largely
been rejected by Florida's Baker Act. 2 Unlike the "sick, obsolescent and unjust"
statutes of many states,3 the Baker Act attempts to balance the legal, medical,
and social aspects of what the Supreme Court of the United States has termed
"a massive curtailment of liberty." 4 Individuals subjected to Florida involuntary hospitalization proceedings are dearly entitled to such due process
rights as notice, 5 hearing, 6 and counsel.T Nevertheless, such recent federal court
inquiries into the mental health area as Lessard v. Schmidt" have suggested
that individuals may be entitled to constitutional rights not mentioned in

1. Prochaska v. Brinegar, 251 Iowa 834, 837, 102 N.W.2d 870, 872 (1960) (commitment
upheld where subject was not present at sanity hearing and never met with or consulted his
attorney).
2. FLA. STAT. §§394.451-.477 (1973). The provisions of the Baker Act dealing directly with
involuntary admission, evaluation, and hospitalization of the mentally ill are found in id.
§§394.463, A67.
3. Kutner, The Illusion of Due Process in Commitment Proceedings, 57 Nw. U.L. REv.
383 (1962).
4. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972) (dictum).
5. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §394A67(2) (1973). See text accompanying notes 31-35 infra.
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §394.467(2) (1973); see text accompanying notes 148-50 infra.
8. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), rev'd on other grounds,
U.S.
(1974) (per
curiam). In Lessard a three-judge United States district court held that Wisconsin's involuntary hospitalization law violated due process under the fourteenth amendment. The court
stated that the statute lacked provisions for notice of "charges," a preliminary hearing on
probable cause, a prompt full hearing on the necessity of commitment, assistance of adversary counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination, and adherence to rules of evidence.
In addition, the court declared that commitment must be based on proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of mental illness and dangerousness and that those seeking commitment must consider less restrictive alternatives. In the original opinion the three-judge panel did not enjoin enforcement of the Wisconsin statutes although the court did state that such action
would be appropriate. Nine months later the court granted injunctive relief. Without going
to the merits the United States Supreme Court, on appeal, reversed and remanded the order
because it lacked specificity as to the acts enjoined. See also In re Barnard, 455 F.2d 1370
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (preliminary hearing required in commitment cases); Heryford v. Parker,
396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968) (right to counsel required in commitment cases).
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Florida law9 and, in fact, have even questioned the very bases upon which
commitment is permitted in Florida.1 0
Involuntary hospitalization may be a sleeping giant in Florida jurisprudence. Appellate decisions, few in number before the Baker Act, have been
nonexistent since it became law in 1972, although commitments have numbered between 3,000 and 4,000 per year."' As a result, many gaps in the Baker
Act remain unfilled by case law. Consequently, several matters present themselves for discussion in this note: an analysis of procedures established by the
Baker Act for the involuntary hospitalization of the mentally ill; a comparison
of those precedures with federal constitutional mandates; discussion of rights
or procedures not yet required by the courts that may serve to humanize and
improve involuntary hospitalization; and, perhaps most importantly, the role
of the Florida attorney in an action for involuntary hospitalization.
INVOLUNTARY HOSPITALIZATION PROVISIONS OF THE BAKER ACT

The Baker Act provides for three types of involuntary confinement: emergency admission, 2 court-ordered evaluation," 3 and involuntary hopsitaliza-

tion.14 Generally the same criteria are considered in determining the applicability of each: the subject must be mentally ill and either likely to injure himself or others if allowed to remain at liberty or lacking in the capacity to seek
out necessary care or treatment for his illness.'5 Nevertheless, the three types
of confinement are not identical - they differ procedurally and in the way the
criteria are applied.
Emergency admission may be authorized by a judge or, in certain instances,
by a physician or law enforcement official,16 based on a reasonable belief the

9. For example, the privilege against self-incrimination. See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349
F. Supp. 1078, 1100-02 (E.D. Wis. 1972). See also text accompanying notes 91-116 infra.
10. For example, Florida permits involuntary hospitalization without a showing of
dangerousness. FLA. STAT. §394A67(1) (1973). Yet a showing of dangerousness may be constitutionally required. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972), citing
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972) (dictum).
11. During the 12-month period ending June 30, 1972, there were 387 voluntary admissions to state mental institutions. This compares with 3,760 involuntary judicial commitments,
531 persons committed by criminal courts and 713 individuals who were involuntarily
medically certified to enter mental institutions. STATE OF FLORIDA, DIVISION or HEALTH & REHABILrrATIVE SERvIcEs, DIVISION OF MENTAL HEALTH, STATISTICAL REPORT OF HosPIrALS FOR
YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1972, at 16.
12. FLA. STAT. §394.463(1) (1973).
13. Id. §394A63(2).

14. Id. §394.467.
15. Id. §§394.4630)(a), A63(2)(a), .467(1).
16. Id. §394A63(l)(b). Unless the individual is reasonably likely to injure himself or
others if left at large, the judge must enter an ex parte order for the emergency detainment.
If the subject appears dangerous, however, a police officer may deliver him to a hospital for
admission, executing a report stating his reasons for doing so. Authorization for emergency
confinement may also be given by a physician who has examined the individual within the

last 48 hours. Id.
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criteria have been satisfied.'7 The maximum period of such confinement is
forty-eight hours, unless a doctor determines that further evaluation or treatment is necessary.18 At the end of an emergency admission period the subject
is released, voluntarily agrees to be examined or hospitalized, or proceedings
for a court-ordered evaluation or involuntary hospitalization are initiated.1 9
Court-ordered evaluation may be authorized if evidence received in a hearing supports a finding by the judge that the criteria for commitment have
been met.20 The procedure may be initiated by the sworn petition of any person, accompanied by two supporting affidavits or a physician's certification that
such evaluation is necessary.2A At the hearing the subject may contest the issue
of his mental health. If the evaluation is ordered it may last no more than five
days. 22 At the end of that time the subject must be released, other arrangements must be made for treating him, or involuntary hospitalization proceed23
ings must be started.
Involuntary hospitalization proceedings are initiated by the recommendation of a hospital administrator with the concurrence of two physicians who
have recently examined the subject. 24 A hearing is held unless waived.2 5 If, in
the estimation of the court, the subject meets the criteria for commitment, he
may be transferred to a treatment facility or otherwise ordered to receive appropriate professional care. 26 Hospitalization is limited to six months, after
which time the subject may request a hearing on continued hospitalization. If
he is not then released a hearing may be requested at the close of each succeed27
ing twelve-month period.

17. Id. §394.463(1)(a).
18. Id. §394.463(1)(d). The original Baker Act limited such confinement to 24 hours unless a need for further evaluation was found. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 131, §7, at 358, amended by
Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 133, §6, at 262.
19. FLA. STAT. §394.463(l)(d) (1973).
20. Id. §394A63(2)(d).
21. Id. §394A63(2)(b). The physician's certificate must be based upon a recent examination. Id.
22. Id. §394A63(2)(e).
23. Id.
24. Id. §394.467(2). The physicians must have examined the patient within the past five
days. Their findings, along with the recommendation of the hospital administrator, are entered on a hospitalization certificate that is filed with the court and serves as a petition for
involuntary hospitalization. Id.
25. Id. Elaborate notice is given to the "patient," as well as to his guardian or representatives, before such a hearing. Id. At the hearing the subject may be represented by
counsel. One of the physicians executing the hospitalization certificate must be present to
testify. Id. §394.467(3)(a).
26. Id. The criteria were expanded in 1973 to include those "in need of care or treatment" who lack "sufficient capacity to make a responsible application" for such help on their
own. Id §394A67(1).
27. Id. §394A67(3)(a), .467(4). Under the original Baker Act such hearings were held only
if the patient requested them; a completed request form, lacking only the patient's signature,
was provided. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 131, §9, at 364. Under present law the form must still be
provided but the patient will receive a hearing unless he executes a waiver, whether or not
the request form is signed. FLA. STAT. §394.467(4)(a) (1973).
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RIGHT TO NoTicE

Traditionally, procedural due process has required adequate advance notice
of claims against a person so that he might have the opportunity to prepare a
defense.2s The United States Constitution seems to require such notice in actions for involuntary hospitalization. 29 Although the Baker Act does not provide for notice in cases of emergency admission, it does require advance notice
of hearings on court-ordered evaluation and involuntary hospitalization."5
Florida's early position was that, since the patient had to be present at a
prehearing medical examination, no notice prior to a sanity hearing was necessary. 31 To the objection that a subject might be examined under the statute
without having any idea of the purpose of the proceedings, one court retorted
that a subject's failure to comprehend what was going on "would be very fair
evidence of the truth of the alleged insanity."3 2 This view has been rejected by
both the Baker Act 33 and modem case law; 34 both require notice before hearings.
The medical profession has usually objected to notice requirements, arguing that service of papers on a mentally ill person fulfills no useful purpose
and may aggravate his condition.35 This argument is fallacious because it
anticipates the findings of a sanity hearing.386 On a practical level, however,

28. See, e.g., Garfield v. United States ex rel. Golsby, 211 U.S. 249 (1908); Holden v.
Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 390 (1898).
29. See, e.g., Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427, 436 (1901) (due process requirements for involuntary commitment have been met where the state provides notice and an opportunity to
defend); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1092 (E.D. Wis. 1972); In re Wellman, 3
Ran. App. 100, 45 P. 726 (1896); State ex rel. Fuller v. Mullinax, 364 Mo. 858, 269 S.W.2d
72 (1954). Contra, Chavannes v. Priestly, 80 Iowa 316, 45 N.W. 766 (1890). Iowa permits commitment without notice and without the subject being present at the hearing, but a trial de

novo on the question of mental illness is held if the commitment is appealed. Hiatt v.
Soucek, 240 Iowa 300, 36 N.W2d 432 (1949). The American Bar Foundation reported in
1971 that notice to the subject is mandatory in 26 of the 42 jurisdictions having involuntary
hospitalization procedures. THE MENTALLY DLABUD AND THE LAw 52 (S.Brakel & R. Rock

eds. 1971).
0. FILA. STAT. §§394.463(l), .463(2)(c), A67(2) (1973). The lack of notice for emergency
admission is understandable, since there is no hearing prior to such confinement and hospitalization is limited to 48 hours unless a hearing is set. Id. §394.463(1). The statute should, but
currently does not, require that the patient's guardian or next-of-kin be notified prior to or
immediately following an emergency admission.
31. Ex parte Scudamore, 55 Fla. 211, 46 So. 279 (1908).
32. Id. at 228, 46 So. at 284.
33. FLA. STAT. §§594.463(2)(c), .467(2) (1973).
34. See, e.g., In re Moyer, 263 So. 2d 286, 288 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1972). Although Moyer
dealt with guardianship and not involuntary hospitalization, the situation is analogous.
Guardianship actions primarily concern property rights, while commitments involve personal
liberty. Thus, commitment proceedings should be subjected to stricter due process requirements.
35. See GROUP FOR THE ADvANCEMENT OF PsYHcIATRY, COMMITMENT PROCEDURES 2 (Rep.
No. 4, April 1948); Weihofen, Hospitalizingthe Mentally Ill,
50 Mica. L. Rnv. 837, 844 (1952).
36. See In re Wellman, 3 Kan. App. 100, 103-04, 45 P. 726, 727 (1896); Kutner, supra note

3,at 395.
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many subjects of involuntary hospitalization actions cannot comprehend and
adequately respond to traditional legal service. As a result, other forms of
notice have been suggested. Papers might be served on relatives or friends. 37 A
physician or social worker might explain the papers to the subject. 33 Alternatively, the court could appoint a lawyer to orally notify the patient; this attorney could remain on the case as the subject's counsel unless the services of
another lawyer were sought. Any form of notice not given directly to the subject, however, involves a substantial risk that harried or even malevolent
doctors, 39 unscrupulous families, 40 or inept counsel 41 might abuse notice requirements.
The Baker Act standards seem to incorporate the advantageous aspects of
both legal and medical concepts of notice. Notification must be given to the
subject as well as to his guardian or representative and other persons having
concern or control over him. 42 Notice given prior to a hearing on a court-ordered evaluation of the patient's mental condition must include a copy of the
admitting petition and must state the time and place of the hearing. 43 If the
patient is discharged at the end of a court-ordered evaluation this information
must be relayed to the patient's guardian or representatives, the court, and the
physician who executed the admission certificate. 4 4 The subject, his guardian,
and the hospital administrator must be notified at least five days in advance of
a hearing on involuntary hospitalization. Notice to the patient and his guardian must include a copy of the hospitalization certificate and a statement that
either may apply to have an attorney appointed if the patient cannot afford
one. 45 The notice must also inform the subject that he has the right to a hearing at any time if a present hearing is waived. Furthermore, a completed

37. See Weihofen, supra note 35, at 844-45.
38. Id.; Kutner, supra note 3, at 395.
39. See F. REDLICH & D. FREEDMAN, THE THEORY AND PRAcrICE OF PSYCHIATRY 780 (1966).
40. See, e.g., O'Rourke v. O'Rourke, 69 So. 2d 567 (La. Ct. App. 1953), modified on other
grounds, 227 La. 262, 79 So. 2d 87 (1955) (commitment wrongfully instituted by brother);
Sheean v. Holman, 6 N.J. Misc. 346, 141 A. 170 (Sup. Ct. 1928) (commitment wrongfully
instituted by father-in-law).
41. See Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally Ill,
44 TEXAS L. REV. 424, 427-30 (1966).
42. Two representatives are chosen by the court if the subject does not have a legal
guardian; one of these must be a spouse, adult child, parent, adult, next-of-kin, adult friend,
or employee of the Division of Family Services. FLA. STAT. §394.463(2)(c) (1973).
Before a court-ordered evaluation, notice must be sent to the patient, his guardian or representatives, any person having "custody and control" of the patient, and to "any other
person, including any persons whose names appear in the patient's court file, that the judge
believes has a concern for the patient's welfare." Id. Notice to the patient and his guardian
or representative is further required before a hearing on involuntary hospitalization, id.
§394.467(2); before continued hospitalization can be ordered after six months, id. §394.467(4)(a);
and before the patient can be released from the hospital or transferred to voluntary status,
id. §394.469(2).

43. Id. §394.463(2)(c).
44.
45.

Id. §394.463(3).
Id. §394.467(2).
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petition for a hearing, requiring only the signature of the patient or his
guardian, and instructions for filing the petition must be included. 46 If, after
six months of confinement, the hospital administrator requests continued
hospitalization, notice of such a request must be sent to the patient and his
47
guardian. A petition for a hearing must again be provided.
Several Florida district courts of appeal cases48 involving guardianship actions49 indicate judicial refinement of the Baker Act notice requirements.
Notice must be established in the hearing record"o and must not only inform
the subject of the time and place where he may appear to defend himself, 51
but also relate with particularity the deficiency from which the subject allegedly suffers, 2 In addition, sufficient time for preparation must be given,
53
notice presented the day of the hearing will not suffice.
Florida standards generally mirror those imposed by the federal court in
Lessard v. Schmidt,54 a decision greatly expanding the procedural due process
rights of individuals involved in involuntary hospitalization actions. The Lessard court required that notice include the names of the examining physicians
and all other persons who might testify in favor of commitment, along with
the substance of their proposed testimony.r z Although there is no similar provision in the Baker Act, some of this information is contained in the admitting
petition required before a court-ordered evaluation hearing or in the hospitalization certificate that is executed prior to the hearing on involuntary hospitalization. Further information can be obtained through use of Florida's liberal
discovery rules for civil actions. 6 The Lessard court also ruled that notice to

46. Id.
47. Id. §394.467(4)(a). A waiver of hearing form is also sent, stating that the patient is
entitled to a hearing if he desires one. Id.
48. In re Moyer, 263 So. 2d 286 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1972); In re White, 230 So. 2d 480 (Ist
D.C.A. Fla. 1970); In re Swain, 199 So. 2d 726 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1967); Rehrer v. Weeks, 106
So. 2d 865 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
49. For a discussion of the analogous nature of guardianship and involuntary hospitaliza-

tion actions, see note 34 supra.
50. In re White, 230 So. 2d 480 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
51. Rehrer v. Weeks, 106 So. 2d 865 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958). Even actual knowledge of the
date and location of the hearing by the subject was held not to convey jurisdiction where
the notice was silent as to time and was conflicting as to place. Id. at 869.
52. In re Moyer, 263 So. 2d 286 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1972). The court stated: "[A] common
thief is entitled to be advised in particularity of the acts and proof thereof which he has
allegedly been guilty of committing prior to his adjudication of guilt and incarceration. It
would only seem fair and proper that a like standard be afforded an alleged incompetent."
Id. at 288. Such a statement is all the more remarkable in view of the fact that mainly
property rights, and not personal liberty rights, were involved.
53. In re Swain, 199 So. 2d 736 (Ist D.CA. Fla. 1967).
54. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
55. Id. at 1092.
56. Since commitment proceedings are civil in nature, State ex rel. Deeb v. Fabisinski,
111 Fla. 454, 464, 152 So. 207, 210 (1934), it may be assumed that the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure would govern discovery. See FLA. R. Crv. P. §§1.280-1.400. A problem arises with
the lengthy time limits for responses permitted under civil discovery rules, since the patient
would presumably remain hospitalized with no right to bail. In Florida, the right to bail is
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the subject must include information as to the standard required for detention. 57 While such data might be a useful addition to Baker Act requirements, 5
it would seem to be a matter of common knowledge to the subject's lawyer.
RIGHT TO PRELIMINARY HEARING ON PROBABLE CAUSE

Lower federal courts have held that a hearing to determine probable cause
for detention is constitutionally required within a reasonable time after an
emergency commitment. 9 The hearing on court-ordered evaluation provided
for by the Baker Act appears to meet this requirement. 60 Before temporarily
committing the subject to a hospital for observation the judge must find
"reason to believe" that the subject is dangerous because of his mental illness
or that he is incapable of seeking out needed treatment 6 1
The hearing on court-ordered evaluation must take place within five days
2
after the filing of a petition calling for it, unless a continuance is warranted.
An individual may waive in writing his right to a hearing but no provision is
made for waiver by anyone other than the subject.6 3 Although the Lessard
court required a preliminary hearing at which the attendance of the subject
could not be waived,6 4 the Florida rule seems preferable for it allows the subject to avoid the trauma of the hearing if he so wishes. While the competency
of the subject to waive a hearing may be doubted, an individual caught up in
hospitalization proceedings will have the aid of counsel whose advice could aid
in an intelligent determination of the question.6 5
The Lessard court mandated a hearing within forty-eight hours of any
emergency commitment.66 The Florida statute requires only that proceedings
leading to a hearing be commenced within forty-eight hours of hospitaliza-

limited to those charged with crimes. FLA. CONsr. art. I, §14.
57. 349 F. Supp. at 1092.
58. This is especially true because the standard in Florida commitment cases is uncertain.
See text accompanying notes 142-143 infra.
59. In re Barnard, 455 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078
(E.D. Wis. 1972).
60. FLA. STAT. §394.463(2)(c) (1973). Under the Baker Act as originally worded, a courtordered evaluation (or voluntary submission to an examination) had to precede a hearing on
involuntary hospitalization. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 131, §7, at 358. The amended statute allows
the court to hold a hearing on involuntary hospitalization immediately following an emergency admission, without the necessity of an intervening court-ordered evaluation. FLA. STAT.
§394.463(1)(d) (1973).
61. Id. §394.463(2)(a).
62. Id. §394.463(2)(c). Continuances will be granted if necessary to allow sufficient preparation for the hearing. Id.
63. Id.
64. 349 F. Supp. at 1091.
65. The evaluation, if ordered, can last only five days. At the end of the five-day period
the staff of the hospital where the evaluation takes place must initiate involuntary hospitalization proceedings, release the patient, or arrive at some voluntary arrangement. FLA. STAT.
§394.463(2)(e) (1973).
66. 349 F. Supp. at 1091.
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tion, 67 and that the hearing be held within five days of notice to the subject. 68
The forty-eight hour limit of Lessard seems to hinder adequate preparation
for the hearing. Indeed, the Lessard court was reluctant to require much in the
way of due process formality from hearing participants because of the brief
preparation period.69 In Florida both sides would have at least a week to prepare, enabling observation of procedural protections and adequate preparation
70
by participants.
RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL

The Florida supreme court has held that jury trials are not required in
commitment actions, despite a provision of the state constitution declaring
that the right to a jury trial shall be secure to all.71 The Supreme Court of the
United States, while it has not directly faced the issue, has by implication 2
and analogy 3 refused to require jury trial in these actions under the Federal
Constitution.7 4 There is no provision in the Baker Act authorizing a jury trial

67.

FLA. STAT.

§394.463(l)(d) (1973).

68. Id. §394.463(2)(c).
69. 349 F. Supp. at 1091-92.
70. Of course, an individual whose commitment is sought would probably remain
hospitalized while his attorney prepares for the hearing. The Florida constitution guarantees
bail only to those charged with a crime or with violation of an ordinance. FLA. CONST. art. I,

§14.
71. Ex parte Scudemore, 55 Fla. 211, 46 So. 279 (1908). FLA. CoNsr. art. 1, §22 declares:
"The right of trial by jury shall be secure to all and remain inviolate." State courts, however, have uniformly limited this provision to situations where a jury could have been demanded before the provision went into effect. See, e.g., Hunt v. City of Jacksonville, 34 Fla.
504, 16 So. 399 (1894); Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Roberts, 2 Fla. 102 (1848) (dictum).
There was no right to a jury trial in Florida commitment actions in 1845, when the first
such provision was adopted, and consequently there is no such right at this time. Ex parte
Scudemore, 55 Fla. 211, 46 So. 279 (1908).
72. See Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 426, 436 (1901), where the Court stated that due process
in civil commitment cases has been met when there is notice and an actual opportunity to
defend. There was no mention of a jury trial requirement. See Montana Co. v. St. Louis
Mining & Milling Co., 152 U.S. 160, 171 (1894), where the Court in dictum cited guardianship statutes to demonstrate that a jury is not always required for due process.
73. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971), the Court, in a plurality opinion
of four justices, declared that trial by jury is not constitutionally required in juvenile cases.
Id. at 545. Parallels between commitment actions and actions involving juveniles may be
noted; for example, both proceedings purport to be nonadversary, and both are designed to
help, not punish, although deprivation of liberty may result. See Cohen, supra note 41, at 449.
74. A few lower federal court decisions have touched on the issue without being particularly decisive. See United States ex rel. Morgan v. Wolfe, 232 F. Supp. 85, 97 (S.D.N.Y.
1964) (jury trial not constitutionally required- dictum); Hager v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
43 F. Supp. 22, 26-27 (E.D. Ky. 1942) (jury trial required by federal and state constitutions dictum). In Ward v. Booth, 197 F.2d 963, 965-66 (9th Cir. 1952), the court refused to constitutionally require a jury in a guardianship action. It should be pointed out, however, that
in such an action personal liberty is not generally at stake. Notice of the right to a jury trial
was required in Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1092 (E.D. Wis. 1972), but there the
right to have a jury upon request was guaranteed by statute. Wis. STAT. §51.03 (1971).
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in involuntary hospitalization proceedings.7 5
Many medical and legal authorities oppose the use of a jury in this type of
action; 6 they describe the traumatic effects on the patient, who might find the
courtroom atmosphere "punitive";77 they point to the reluctance of relatives
to expose what they consider to be a private shame or disgrace, possibly leading
to postponement of effective early treatment; 78 and they suggest that lay juries
are unqualified to deal with "medical" questions.7 9 One commentator states:
"It seems utterly improbable the proper disposition of the mentally ill would
occur in the arena of the public courtroom with all the trappings of a criminal
trial." 80
Commitment, however, is a legal procedure. The notion remains firm in
English and American law that juries are the best instrument for ascertaining
matters when personal liberty is at stake, and that the abandonment of the
jury system ought to be undertaken only for the best of reasons. The argument
of trauma to the patient, for example, smacks of the prejudgment fallacy. 81
The idea of mortification of relatives may lack support as public attitudes
toward the mentally ill are modified by education.
Perhaps the most questionable argument against juries is that they are incompetent to decide the issues in commitment proceedings. Little proof has
been offered to support that argument apart from the 1913 claims of a medical
journal that there was an increase in "wrongful" commitments after Illinois
switched to a jury trial system.8 2 Typical of antijury rhetoric is the statement
of one practitioner that given the tendency on the part of juries to ignore
psychiatric testimony he could "clean out" the local mental hospital in short
order if they were allowed to hear habeas corpus petitions. 83
Arguments against jury proceedings seem to lose their relevance if one
views commitment as a social issue as opposed to a medical one. One commentator has stated that psychiatry is as much a type of social control as the

75. FLA. STAT. §394.467(3)(a) (1973) places the duty of determining whether the subject
meets the criteria for involuntary hospitalization on the "court." Before the 1973 amendments, this section used the word "Judge." Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 131, §9, at 364. The term
"judge" clearly preempted the use of a jury as factfinder; the term "court" probably has the
same effect.
76. See, e.g., Wenger 8, Fletcher, The Effect of Legal Counsel on Admissions to a State
Mental Hospital: A Confrontation of Professions, 10 J. HEALTH & SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 66, 67
(1969); Weihofen, supra note 35, at 848-49.
77. See, e.g., Wenger & Fletcher, supra note 76, at 67.
78. See, e.g., Weihofen, supra note 35, at 848-49.
79. Id. at 849.
80. Cohen, supra note 41, at 443.
81. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
82. Dewey, The Jury Law for Commitment of the Insane in Illinois (1867-1893) and Mrs.
E.P.W. Packard,Its Author, 69 AM. J. INSANITY 571 (1913), cited in Weihofen, supra note 35.
at 849.
83. Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 62
(1961) (statement of Hugh McGee, a District of Columbia attorney specializing in mental
health cases) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
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law, but attempts to disguise itself as a "science" by translating information
received verbally into a technical "scientific" language.8 4 Under this view
commitment proceedings raise the same issue that juries have traditionally
handled: whether the individual should be removed from society. Another
authority has stated: "IT]he cross-section of the community may be the best
agent, not to diagnose mental illness, but to apply the diagnosis of the experts
to the social context in which the patient exists."8 5
Mandatory jury trials are not advisable, for the possibility of harm to some
subjects from such proceedings is real. The subject and his attorney should be
able to consider alternatives to traditional legal formalities, just as they should
consider alternatives to hospitalization. 86 The choice of jury trial or hearing,
however, should be left to the individual and his counsel. Furthermore, a jury
proceeding need not be public. Indeed, it need not be as formal as a criminal
trial. But because of the vague commitment criteria8 7 and difficulty in defining
deviant conduct," it would seem wise to rely on the experience and intuition
of a fellow group of citizens who can empathize with the plight of the subject
while remaining aware of society's need for safety and order.89
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

A nearly unanimous tide of state court opinions runs against extending the
privilege against self-incrimination to involuntary hospitalization proceedings.90
Basically, the decisions proclaim that because involuntary commitment serves
a legitimate medical interest it is not a criminal penalty, 91 and therefore the
fifth amendment privilege should not be applicable.92

84. Leifer, The Competence of the Psychiatrist To Assist in the Determination of Incompetency: A Sceptical Inquiry into the Courtroom Function of Psychiatrists, 14 SYRAcusE
L. REv. 564, 569 (1963).
85. Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MicH. L. REv.
945, 963 (1959).

86. See text accompanying notes 179-180 infra.
87. See text accompanying notes 116-141 infra.
88. See text accompanying notes 123-125 infra.
89. In 1971, sixteen jurisdictions allowed jury trials in commitment actions; in no state
was a jury trial mandatory. Only Ohio forbade jury trials. THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE
LAW 53 (S. Brakel 8- R. Rock, eds. 1971).
90. See, e.g., In re Coburn, 165 Cal. 202, 131 P. 352 (1913); People v. English, 31 Ill. 2d
301, 201 N.E.2d 455 (1964); People v. Fuller, 24 N.Y.2d 292, 248 N.E.2d 17, 300 N.Y.S.2d 102
(1969).
91. People v. Fuller, 24 N.Y.2d 292, 248 N.E.2d 17, 300 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1969); Commonwealth v. Linn, 3 Pa. D. &C. 2d 417 (Allegheny County 0. & T. 1955).
92. See, e.g., People v. English, 31 Ill. 2d 301, 201 N.E.2d 455 (1964); People v. Fuller,
24 N.Y.2d 292, 248 N.E.2d 17, 300 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1969). Contra, Lessard v. Schmidt, 349
F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972). There are no Florida decisions directly on point, but the
state clearly rejects the privilege against self-incrimination when asserted following a criminal
insanity defense. Parkin v. State, 238 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
See text accompanying notes 105-107 infra.
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The principal impetus for examining the relationship between the selfincrimination privilege and involuntary commitment is In re Gault,9' in which
the Supreme Court of the United States extended the fifth amendment privilege to juvenile proceedings. The similarities between juvenile and commitment actions are striking: both are "nonadversary," although deprivation of
liberty is possible; both are allegedly designed to help, not punish; both primarily determine a status, and not guilt or innocence as to a particular act.94
The analogy satisfied the Lessard court, which, relying largely on Gault, extended the privilege to involuntary hospitalization actions. 95
Under the Lessard rule statements made to a psychiatrist by the subject of
a commitment hearing may not serve as the basis for hospitalization unless
they are made voluntarily and with knowledge of possible consequences. 96 The
court balanced two conflicting interests- loss of the individual's liberty and
the prospect of a seriously ill person escaping treatment simply by refusing to
talk to a doctor - and opted strongly against the latter. The court did not,
97
however, command the presence of counsel at the psychiatric interview.
The incarceration of juveniles in Gault has not proved indistinguishable
from involuntary hospitalization. The juveniles in Gault committed criminal
acts and faced criminal penalties. 98 Conduct for which involuntary hospitalization is sought is generally not criminal. 9 In juvenile actions the inquiry is
aimed at establishing past criminal conduct, the proceeding being one in which
the privilege against self-incrimination has traditionally been afforded. In a
hospitalization hearing the privilege is not applicable for the patient's mind,
not criminal conduct, is being investigated. 10 0 Also, while the juvenile court
system is aimed at reforming the individual, little actual rehabilitation is attempted. 0 1 It has been stated, however, that most hospitalization programs
10 2
provide for bona fide treatment.
A concurring justice in a recent federal case' 1 3 stated that the privilege
against self-incrimination could not be made available in involuntary hospitalization actions because the necessity for reliable inquiry into the subject's
mental condition is impossible in the absence of active cooperation by the subject. The unpleasant and unfeasible alternative would be for psychiatrists to
diagnose on the basis of statements of persons coming in contact wth the sub-

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
(1969).
100.
curring
101.
102.
curring
103.

387 U.S. 1 (1967).
Cohen, supra note 41, at 448-49.
349 F. Supp. at 1100-02.
Id. at 1102.
Id. at 1101.
387 U.S. at 50.
See People v. Fuller, 24 N.Y.2d 292, 302, 248 N.E.2d 17, 21, 300 N.Y.S.2d 102, 107
Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1162 n.7 (4th Cir. 1971)
and dissenting).
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 51 (1967).
Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1162 n.7 (4th Cir. 1971)
and dissenting).
Id. at 1162.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1974

(Sobeloff, J., con-

(Sobeloff, J., con-

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [1974], Art. 5
1974]

INVOLUNTARY

HOSPITALIZATION

OF THE MENTALLY ILL

519

Florida has no civil commitment case on point, but in Parkin v. State'05
the Supreme Court of Florida held the privilege unavailable to a person asserting an insanity defense.U0 6 Stating that no mental examination would be
possible if the subject could refuse interrogation, the courit determined that by
raising the issue of insanity the criminal defendant had waived his privilege. 107
This concept of waiver cannot apply to involuntary commitment cases, however, as there the subject is by no means a volunteer.
The argument that the privilege against self-incrimination would effectively cripple involuntary hospitalization is persuasive. Although the subject
should not be able to refuse to participate in a psychiatric interview, conversely, he should not be forced to testify at his hearing. 0
Various protective devices are utilized to ensure that any information extracted from the subject will not expose him to criminal liability. In Florida
criminal trials, for example, incriminating admissions made to a court-appointed psychiatrist may not be entered into evidence unless the area is opened
during examination by defense counsel. 0 9 In addition, the state may not interrogate a psychiatrist with an eye toward impeachment of the defendant." 0
Other states provide similar safeguards in commitment cases. Illinois allows
the subject to refuse to disclose potentially incriminating information at a
medical examination"' or at a judicial hearing where testimony is compelled." 2 New York does not permit information obtained from an involuntary
commitment of a narcotics addict to be used against him in a criminal action.m 3 A provision similar to that of New York is needed in the Baker Act.
While it should not generally be applied to involuntary hospitalization actions, the privilege against self-incrimination should be made available if the
subject's attorney can prove hospitalization in a given case is merely "a veneer
for an extended jail term.""14 The subject should be the beneficiary of every

ject.10 4

104. Id.
105. 238 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1970).
106. "Illness, particularly mental illness, although often capable of being proved by
extrinsic evidence, is considered more susceptible to proof by evidence based on interviews
with the defendant and requiring his cooperation." Id. at 821.
107. Id.
108. Compare People ex rel. Keith v. Keith, 38 11. 2d 405, 231 N.E.2d 887 (1967) (subject in a civil commitment proceeding may be forced to testify against his will), with People
v. Rios, 27 N.Y.2d 202, 265 N.E.2d 67, 316 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1970) (subject in a commitment

action need not testify at the hearing and is entitled to a jury instruction that exercise of
the right to remain silent is not to be held against him). There is also the practical problem
of trying to force a subject to reveal to a psychiatrist incidents and ideas that he does not
wish to discuss. Drugs are a possible, although perhaps undesirable, means of achieving such
revelations.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Parkin v. State, 238 So. 2d 817, 821 (Fla. 1970).
McMunn v. State, 264 So. 2d 868 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
2d 301, 201 N.E.2d 455 (1964).
People v. English, 31 111.
See People ex rel.Keith v. Keith, 38 III. 2d 405, 231 NXE.2d 387 (1967).
People v. Fuller, 24 N.Y.2d 292, 301-02, 248 N.E.2d 17, 21, 300 N.Y.S.2d 102, 107

(1969).
114. Id.
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safeguard of criminal due process upon a showing that involuntary hospitalization is, or is indistinguishable from, a criminal sanction. 115
CRITERIA FOR COMMITMENT AND THE BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF

Criteria
Due process guarantees will do little to ensure just and valid involuntary
hospitalizations if the criteria for commitment are hopelessly vague. In considering whether to extend the strict clarity requirements of the criminal lawll6
to involuntary commitment, however, it can be argued that the subject lacks
the mental capacity to be guided by statements of criteria, regardless of how
clearly they are drafted. 117 Nevertheless, vague standards lend themselves to
arbitrary, discriminatory, and, above all, inconsistent application by the state
and its agents."18
The Baker Act permits involuntary hospitalization of a mentally ill individual under two circumstances: if he is likely to injure himself or others unless restrained, or if he is incompetent to seek needed treatment and care." 19
Under the first criterion, dangerousness, commitment has traditionally been
justified as an exercise of the police power applied by the state to protect society from harm."20 The second criterion, incompetence to seek help, has
foundation in the doctrine of parens patriae, which traditionally allows the
state to protect persons deemed incapable of caring for themselves.' 2 ,
Involuntary hospitalization of the dangerous involves three elements: first,
the subject must be mentally ill; second, his conduct must be predictable; and
third, this predictable future conduct must reach a certain level of danger to
himself or others. Generally, it can be assumed that the initial requirement of
mental illness simply ensures that certain persons ordinarily thought mentally

115. Guidelines for determining when inadequate care and treatment bring commitment
to this level may be found in "right to treatment" cases such as Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493
F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974) (involuntarily hospitalized patients have a constitutional right to
treatment aimed at curing them or improving their mental condition).
116. "[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates the first essential of due process of law." Connally v. General Const. Co.,
269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
117. Combs, Burden of Proof and Vagueness in Civil Commitment Proceedings,2 Am. J.
CRIM. L. 47, 55 (1973).

118. Id. This has been relied upon as an alternative ground for finding vagueness in
criminal statutes. "It is established that a law fails to meet the requirements of the Due
Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it ... leaves judges and jurors free to
decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case." Giacco v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966).
119. FLA. STAT. §394A67(1) (1973). The same criteria govern emergency admission, id.
§394.463(l)(a), and court-ordered evaluation, id. §394.463(2)(a).
120. Postal, Civil Commitment: A Function Analysis, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 51 (1971).
121. Id. at 52.
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or the lives of
sound who nevertheless endanger their lives (such as test pilots)
122
others (such as drunk drivers) will not fall under the statute.
That future human conduct may be predicted is doubtful. One study asserts that there is no known way to predict future homicidal conduct. 23 In a
somewhat more liberal view, a psychoanalyst has seen only very limited possibilities for such accurate predictions. 24 Lacking an ability to predict, the
state should strictly construe the predictability requirement. 2 5 Courts should
require that only the most trustworthy and concrete data be used in making
the prediction. 26 Every commitment decision should recite, as much as
possible, the evidence bearing on predictability. Detailed opinions would aid
accurate prediction in future cases.127 Certainly the degree of danger involved
(compare murder, theft, and verbal abuse) and the imminence of its happening (immediately as compared with eventually) along with the general probability of its happening (extremely likely as opposed to possibly) should be
28
taken into account.
Reliance on the police power forces the assumption that proscribed or
dangerous conduct can be separated from nondangerous conduct. Even among
psychiatrists there is no consensus as to the meaning of "dangerousness" or the
degree needed to justify involuntary hospitalization. 29 Apparently the drafters
of the Baker Act attempted to avoid vagueness by substituting the more narrow concept of "injure" for the general standard of danger.1 0 Yet, in discussing
a similarly-worded District of Columbia statute, one commentator has in31
quired:
Does [injury] include non-violent acts not directed towards a particular
individual, such as talking out loud in a public place? Does "injury"
refer only to the consequences of an act for which there is either a criminal sanction or a recovery under a particular tort doctrine? What is the
nature of the "injury" to the self which is encompassed by the Act? Is
it intended to cover only acts directed towards taking one's own life or
causing grievous bodily damage to one's self?
The District of Columbia courts have defined the term "injury" to include the

See SZASZ, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: "Treatment" or Social Restraint?, 125
122.
J. NERVous & MENTAL DisorwzRs 293, 298-99 (1957).
123. J. MAcDONAtD, HOmICIDAL THREATS (1968), cited in Shapiro, The Psychiatrist and
the Problem of Social Control, 127 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 1098 (1971) (letter to the editor).
124. Waelder, Psychic Determinism and the Possibility of Predictions,32 PSYCHOANALYTIC

Q. 15 (1963).

125. Shapiro, supra note 123.
126. This was required by the Lessard court. 349 F. Supp. at 1093.
127. Postel, supra note 120, at 92.

128. Id. at 76-89.
129. Katz & Goldstein, Dangerousness and Mental Illness, 131 J. NERVOUS
DISORDERS 404, 408 (1960); see F. REDLICH &D. FREEDMAN, supra note 39, at 782.

ANt) MENTAL

130. See FLA. STAT. §394.467(1)(a) (1973),
131. Postel, supra note 120, at 54,
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consequences of any criminal act 32 - even harm to the feelings. 133 Unless the
standard is more clearly delineated in Florida's statutory language, the meaning of "injury" may be altered each time a particular judge or psychiatrist
interprets it. The law should aim for specificity and adopt a standard of predicted physical injury based, as the Lessard court required, "upon finding of
a recent overt act, attempt or threat to do substantial harm to oneself or an34

other."
Besides allowing dangerous subjects to be committed, the Baker Act as
amended 85 permits involuntary hospitalization where the mental illness of an
individual renders him incompetent to judge and seek out the care and treatment he needs.1s6 This provision is more vague than that governing danger-

ousness. Because it is presumed that anyone who is mentally ill needs treatment, the failure of a subject to obtain medical help might lead to commitment under this section despite the presence or absence of aggression. 37 Not all
types of mental illness deprive individuals of their capacity for logic and
reason. 1 The Lessard opinion noted that because of the stigma, upheaval, and
curtailment of rights involved, treatment involving hospitalization in many
3 91
cases is unnecessary and improper.

Clearly, a simple finding of mental illness should not inescapably lead to a
presumption of incompetence sufficient to compel treatment under this criterion. 140 Involuntary hospitalization, when justified by the parens patriae doctrine, must be administered solely for the benefit of the individual involved,
and not merely for the benefit of those annoyed by "deviant," but non4
dangerous, behavior.' '

Burden and Standard of Proof
Not only do the involuntary hospitalization criteria present a definitional
problem, but the degree of proof necessary to establish these criteria remains
uncertain. Early Florida decisions suggest that the burden of proving insanity

132. "Injury" has encompassed even the cashing of bad checks. Overholser v. Russell, 283
F.2d 195, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
133. Carras v. District of Columbia, 183 A.2d 393, 395 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1962).
134. 349 F. Supp. at 1093. Emergency admission under the original Baker Act was possible only where there was a likelihood of physical injury. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 131, §7, at
357, amended by Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 133, §6, at 261.
135. The original Baker Act permitted involuntary hospitalization only where the individual was likely to injure himself or others. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 131, §9, at 362.
136. FLA. STAT. §394.467(1)(b) (1973). This standard is also used to determine the necessity of a court-ordered evaluation, id. §394.463(2)(a)(2), and, if ordered by a judge, an emergency admission, id. §394.463(1)(a)(2).
137. See Postel, supra note 120, at 34.
138. Id. at 35.
139. 349 F. Supp at 1094.
140. Postel, supra note 120, at 91.
141. Szasz, supra note 122, at 303.
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is on the party alleging it.142 Nevertheless, no Florida case has precisely de-

fined the requisite standard of proof.
In a Florida guardianship action a reasonable doubt standard was adopted
for determining incompetence to handle business affairs. 143 The court in Lessard declared the reasonable doubt standard to be constitutionally required in
commitment cases,14 ' basing its decision on In re Winship,45 where that standard was held applicable to juvenile cases. Practically speaking, there exists a
reasonable doubt about virtually all involuntary hospitalizations that are based
on either future predictions or some vague standard of incompetency. One commentator, who is aware of this problem but fears that the civil "preponderance
of the evidence" standard aids in discriminatory use of commitment laws, has
called for a "clear and convincing" standard of proof.l 46
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL

Because complicated legal questions are often involved, the assistance of an
attorney is desirable and necessary in actions for involuntary hospitalization.
The Baker Act provides for counsel during the hearing on court-ordered evaluation, 147 the hearing to determine sanity,148 and any hearing on continued
hospitalization. 149 Advance notice of the right is required and the court must
appoint an attorney if the subject cannot afford one. These provisions appear
to satisfy constitutional guarantees.150
The statute does not mandate representation in every case nor does it mention that the right to counsel may be waived. Waiver of this right is permitted
in criminal cases if it is voluntarily and intelligently made.1 51 Yet, it is questionable whether the subject of commitment proceedings can make a cora-

142. See, e.g., Schaefer v. Voyle, 88 Fla. 170, 102 So. 7 (1924).
143.

In re Pickles, 170 So. 2d 603, 614 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1965).

144. 349 F. Supp. at 1093.
145. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
146.

Combs, supra note 117, at 65. Such a standard requires "clear, unequivocal, and

convincing evidence that the facts alleged ... are true." Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966) (clear and convincing standard of proof required in
deportation cases). The Supreme Court of the United States has also applied this standard
in denaturalization cases, e.g., Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943), and
expatriation actions, e.g., Gonzales v. Landon, 350 U.S. 920 (1955). The standard may be
applied by state courts in fraud and other types of cases. See 9 J. WIGMORE, EvMENcF §2498
(3d ed. 1940).
147. FLA. STAT. §394A63(2)(c) (1973).
148. Id. §394.467(3)(a).
149. Id. §394.467(4)(a).
150. In Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968), the court held that the subject of involuntary commitment proceedings must be afforded counsel at every step of the
proceedings unless this right is effectively waived by one authorized to act in his behalf.
The right to counsel also exists at a preliminary hearing to determine probable cause for
commitment. In re Barnard, 455 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349

F. Supp. 1078, 1098 (EDl. Wis. 1972).
151. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
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petent waiver. One federal court has advised that counsel be appointed if for
any reason the subject appears unrepresented.152 Other courts have held that
if the subject refuses to cooperate with appointed counsel, the constitution
does not require appointment of another 53 even if he is left without effective
representation.
Prior to the Baker Act, Florida's commitment statute provided that in cases
of emergency hospitalization the patient had the right to telephone his attorney or family immediately. 54 The attorney was specifically permitted to visit
and consult with the subject in the hospital. 55 Regrettably, comparable provisions do not appear in the Baker Act. Although emergency hospitalization
may last only forty-eight hours before other proceedings are instituted, the
patient should be permitted to call his family or lawyers at the earliest possible
moment. If representation at the involuntary hospitalization stage is not
specified in the law, the staff of a hospital may be inclined to obstruct efforts
to communicate with counsel.
Aside from guaranteeing the right to counsel, Florida law gives little indication of what this right entails. A broad view of what is encompassed has been
expressed by Federal Circuit Judge Sobeloff in his separate opinion in Tippett
v. Maryland.156 Judge Sobeloff would not insist that the lawyer participate in
individual psychiatric examinations167 The attorney should, however, be permitted to take part in hospital staff investigations, to examine the patient's
medical file, and to discuss the case freely with the psychiatric staff. 158 This, he
suggested, should ensure that psychiatric conclusions rest on an accurate factual
basis. In addition, the lawyer's assistance might help dispel patient distrust of
interrogations conducted by staff members of the incarcerating institution. 50
DOCTORS VERSUS LAWYERS - WHO SHOULD MAKE THE COMMITMENT DECISION?

The issue of ultimate authority over commitment actions has historically
strained relations between the legal and medical professions.160 Doctors have
traditionally favored informal types of admission to mental hospitals and have
objected to formal procedural requirements such as notice of the patient's
presence in the court.161 Physicians argue due process "rights" actually cause

152. Dooling v. Overholser, 243 F.2d 825, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (dictum).
153. See in re Basso, 299 F.2d 933 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Mazza v. Pechacek, 233 F.2d 666
(D.C. Cir. 1956); Rivers v. Munson, 125 F.2d 393 (D.C. Cir. 1941). In both the Basso and
Mazza cases the subject objected to his counsel's failure to oppose commitment.
154. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 7, §4, at 15 (repealed 1971).
155.

Id.

156. 436 F.2d 1153, 1159 (4th Cir. 1971) (Sobeloff, J., concurring and dissenting).
157. Id. at 1164.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See Wenger & Fletcher, supra note 76, at 67-68.
161. REDLICH & FREEDMAN, supra note 39, at 780.
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psychological harm to the subject. 162 On the other hand, lawyers assert that
formal procedural safeguards are necessary to prevent involuntary hospitalization of sane persons.163 There is merit in both positions.10 '
Some legal commentators, and even some doctors, have objected to the role
of the medical profession in commitment proceedings. With vague criteria for
commitment and limited participation by attorneys, it is argued that psychiatrists are making the actual decisions to commit. Legal proceedings are merely
"ceremonial, 165 and the psychiatrist assumes the unaccustomed role of a social
enforcer.G6 The psychiatrist's conception of community needs may conflict with
his conception of himself as a therapist whose primary allegiance is to his

patient.167

Furthermore, psychiatry's ability to diagnose has been characterized by
some as an art rather than as a science. Mental illness is not a physical fact, it
is a concept used to classify behavior.16s Thus, the basic question of involuntary
hospitalization is social and not medical, and the answer lies in balancing the
right to liberty with state prohibitions on self-destruction. If this assumption
is entertained it may be argued that psychologists and other social scientists
are at least as competent to testify as medical experts. 69
Commitment questions seemingly involve nothing more than academic issues for doctors and call only for their opinions. Courts have a duty to weigh
these opinions against other evidence in deciding whether to issue orders for
commitment or release. 170 Although the testimony of doctors may be highly
regarded by courts, the attorney should be free to present his own experts on
social behavior, such as sociologists or psychologists.71 Regardless of the source,
testimony in commitment proceedings should be directed toward facts and
predictions ("the subject has attempted to kill his children; he will probably
attempt this again") rather than vague and legally meaningless scientific judgments ("the subject suffers from paranoid schizophrenia").72

162. See Weihofen, supra note 35.
163. Kutner, supra note 3, at 397. According to this article, persons may be "railroaded"
into mental institutions even in these enlightened times because the medical profession sometimes circumvents legal requirements. A grotesque example from Illinois is cited. A former
inmate of Nazi concentration camps was committed largely because he could not speak English; his lack of understanding of what was happening to him resulted in his suicide. Id.
at 383-84. Medical authorities, on the other hand, claim that the fear of sane men being
committed is without any basis in fact. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 83, at 21 (testimony of
Winfred Overholser, M.D., Superintendent of St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, D.C.).
164. Weihofen, supra note 35, at 838.
165. Cohen, supra note 41, at 425.
166. See Szasz, supra note 122, at 296; Shapiro, supra note 123, at 1098.
167. See Szasz, supra note 122, at 296-97; REDLICH & FREEDMAN, supra note 39, at 200-01.
168. Ross, supra note 85, at 961.
169. See Szasz, supra note 122, at 296; Ross, supra note 85, at 963.
170. See Katz & Goldstein, supra note 129, at 411.
171. See Cohen, supra note 41, at 450.
172. Combs, supra note 117, at 63.
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ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY IN INVOLUNTARY HOSPITALIZATION PROCEEDINGS

The role of the medical profession in involuntary hospitalization has been
carefully defined. In contrast, an attorney representing the subject of an involuntary hospitalization action is without the guidance of statutes or precedent with regard to his proper role.y73 An attorney often is appointed to handle
several dozen cases at one time, obtains his knowledge about each case by a
cursory glance at the file, and makes little effort to confer with his "clients."
Throughout the hearings he may remain silent, his presence being merely "a
gesture toward the protection of civil liberties." 174 This type of performance,
unfortunately, is often acquiesced in if not required by other participants in
the drama. 75
Yet the lawyer should not be placed in the position of a "defense counsel,"
his performance being judged by whether he has "gotten his client off." The
underlying purpose of a commitment action is to determine if the subject needs
help, with involuntary hospitalization viewed by all parties as a possible solution rather than as a penalty. The lawyer must guard his client's rights, but
the total adversary role with which he is most familiar is not suitable in this
1
type of action. 76
Generally, the attorney in an involuntary hospitalization action should
provide "counsel" in the broadest sense of that word. 17 7 He should examine
fully the patient's situation, carefully weighing the medical, legal, and social
aspects. 78 If he determines that treatment is needed he should make this recommendation to the client,' 79 but he is responsible for examining all possible
alternatives rather than viewing the choices as merely total incarceration versus

173. See R. ROCK, M. JACOBSON & R. JANOPAUL, HOSPITALIZATION AND DISCHARGE OF THE
MENTALLY ILL 157-60 (1968); Cohen, supra note 41.
174. One commentator witnessed such a performance in Texas: 40 persons were committed in 75 minutes at one hearing. The attorney "representing" them sought solely to ensure that notice requirements were met. The attorney was paid only $10 a case by the state.
Cohen, supra note 41, at 427-30.
175. If the attorney does more than follow the "empty ritual" he may upset the system.
The judge may be angered, and the attorney may never again be appointed to defend patients (in Texas such an appointment enables at attorney to earn a quick $300-.$400). Cohen,
supra note 41, at 448.
176. The Lessard court required that counsel be an adversary, as opposed to a mere
neutral party. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1098-99 (E.D. Wis. 1972). The weight
of authority, however, holds that counsel need not be an adversary and may even favor commitment. See, e.g., In re Basso, 299 F.2d 933 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Mazza v. Pechacek, 233 F.2d
666 (D.C. Cir. 1956). It is interesting to observe that while the original Baker Act made no
provision for any adversary party, the statute as amended in 1973 allows the state attorney to
enter the action on behalf of the state. FLA. STAT. §394.467(3)(a) (1973). The provision serves
to increase the resemblance between involuntary hospitalization and criminal trials, and may
help fuel an argument that all criminal due process rights should be afforded those involved
in commitment actions.
177. See Cohen, supra note 41, at 445-46.
178. Id.; see THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 55 (S. Brakel & R. Rock eds. 1971).
179. See In re Basso, 299 F.2d 933 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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total freedom. Apart from simple assurance that legal formalities are being
met, the lawyer's purpose is to see that discretion conferred upon psychiatrists

by ambiguous statutory criteria is not arbitrarily exercised.1 10
After taking a case the lawyer's first responsibility is to study all records
available and to confer with his dient.18 1 He should try to understand why the
action has been brought. s2 In addition, he should seek to authenticate any
3
"facts," which may have led to the petition for hospitalization.18
Counsel's next step is to discuss the case with the examining and treating
physicians and persons likely to testify at the hearing. A major part of the attorney's role consists of alerting these doctors to the grave social and legal
implications of incarceration.8 4 All too frequently in commitment cases the

opinions of psychiatrists are accepted outright by lawyers and judges; this
phenomenon is no more proper in commitment proceedings than in cases involving insanity defenses or large estates.8 5 The attorney should ascertain the
amount of attention given his client's condition and the facts and tests upon
which a diagnosis was based. 8 6 He should learn what treatment will be recommended.18 7 If the lawyer is dissatisfied with the responses to such queries he

ought to consider hiring an outside psychiatric expert for an additional opin88

ion.
Furthermore, the attorney should thoroughly investigate alternatives to
simple commitment, such as outpatient care or private psychiatric consulta-

180. Cohen, supra note 41, at 449-50.
181. Id. at 452. This is one of the few aspects of the attorney's role that has been
scrutinized by courts. An early New York case established the principle that no one may
interfere with the right of the attorney to confer with his client. In re Fox, 138 App. Div. 43,
122 N.Y.S. 889 (2d Dep't 1910). A more recent Iowa case, however, upheld a commitment

where the subject's attorney never met or consulted with him. Prochaska v. Brinegar, 251
Iowa 834, 102 N.V.2d 870 (1960). The court stated: "Certainly if any presumption is to be
indulged in, it is that counsel performed his duties according to law and, as it appeared to
him, acted for the best interest of his client." Id. at 838, 102 N.W.2d at 872. The decision
has been justly criticized. Cohen, supra note 41, at 442. See In re Moynihan, 332 Mo. 1022,
62 S.W.2d 410 (1933).
182. Cohen, supra note 41, at 452.
183. Id. See also Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1164 (4th Cir. 1971) (Sobeloff, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
184. Kumasaka, The Lawyer's Role in Involuntary Commitment-New York's Experience, MENTAL HYGIENE, Spring 1972, at 29. See Cohen, supra note 41, at 455.
185. See Cohen, supra note 41, at 450.
186. In criminal cases involving insanity defenses, the length of a psychiatric interview
may affect the admissibility of the doctor's testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 437
F.2d 371, 378 (4th Cir. 1971) (10-minute interview too brief to serve as basis for psychiatric
testimony); Bush v. McCollum, 231 F. Supp. 560, 563-64 (N.D. Tex. 1964), aff'd, 344 F.2d
672 (5th Cir. 1965) (40-minute interview held to be too cursory). Cf. Rollerson v. United
States, 343 F.2d 269, 274 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
187. Cohen, supra note 41, at 453-54.
188. In a criminal case where sanity is seriously at issue, an indigent must be provided
with a psychiatric expert in addition to his lawyer. Bush v. McCollum, 231 F. Supp. 560,
565 (N.D. Tex. 1964). Certainly there is a need for such a right in involuntary hospitalization proceedings where sanity is the only major issue.
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tion.1S9 He may also wish to investigate the conditions to which a committed

patient has been exposed. At this time he should undertake the important
functions of interpreter and counselor for his client. He must digest the accumulated data and translate it into meaningful terms, attempting to apprise
his client of the present situation and possible avenues for future action. 19°
The lawyer then makes his recommendations.
In some cases, of course, the subject of the commitment action may lack
the ability to decide intelligently the proper course of action. To some degree
the lawyer may have to judge for him.'9 ' In any event, if the lawyer believes
that some sort of treatment is warranted it is his duty to so inform his client.
At that point the client's wishes and the opinions of the doctors involved in
the case should be examined to see if a voluntary out-of-court compromise is
possible. Perhaps the physicians will agree to a discharge or perhaps the subject can be persuaded to accept some type of treatment. 92 If, however, no
settlement can be reached and the subject persists in objecting to commitment,
93
the attorney must either defend him or withdraw from the case.1
At a hearing the lawyer should bring to light the issues involved. He may
wish to force the psychiatrists to elaborate on treatment alternatives or to state
the policy behind their recommendations.1 4 Certainly he should continue to
press for a settlement. In the end, if the individual is in fact committed or
voluntarily agrees to hospitalization, the lawyer should ensure that his legal
affairs are in order. 9 5
Studies indicate that the number of forced commitments declines as attorneys take a more active role in hospitalization proceedings.296 There are
three possible reasons for such a decline. First, physicians may be intimidated
by the presence of lawyers and may consequently consider their recommendations more carefully. 9 7 Second, judges may simply tend to place great credence

189. The court in Lessard held that involuntary hospitalization was to be considered a
last resort; those advocating such incarceration were given the burden of proving that all
available alternatives had been investigated and found unsuitable. 349 F. Supp. at 1095-96.

Of course, the subject's attorney should conduct a similar investigation and separately judge
the findings from his client's point of view. Another decision holding that the state must
employ the least drastic means of treatment is Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 660-61 (D.C.

Cir. 1966).
190. Cohen, supra note 41, at 454-56.
191. ROCK, JACOBSON & JANOPAUL, supra note 173, at 157-58.
192. See Kumasaka & Stokes, Involuntary Hospitalizations: Opinions and Attitudes of
Psychiatristsand Lawyers, 13 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 201 (1972).

193. Cohen, supra note 41, at 451-52. Of course, any lawyer coming into the proceedings
at this late date might lack effectiveness in assisting the client.
194. Id. at 456-57.
195.

R.

JANOPAUL,

PROBLEMS IN HOSPITALIZING THE MENTALLY ILL

13-14 (American Bar

Foundation Research Memorandum Series No. 31, 1962), cited in Cohen, supra note 41, at
445-56.
196. See, e.g., Kumasaka, Stokes & Gupta, Criteria for Involuntary Hospitalization, 26
ARCHIVES

GEN. PSYCHIATRY

399, 404 (1972); Wenger & Fletcher, supra note 160, at 66.

197. See Kumasaka, supra note 184, at 29.
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in the views of lawyers, as opposed to views of physicians. 198 Third, attorneys
may successfully persuade their clients to accept needed treatment voluntarily.199
Few would argue that involuntary hospitalization ought to be abolished;
its necessity is clear in some cases. Persons dangerous to society must be confined and those incapable of obtaining necessary help must be given it. Yet the
involuntary element of commitments makes them unpleasant, to say the least,
for all concerned. Many physicians believe that treatment accepted voluntarily
is likely to be more effective in the long run. 200 The lawyer's role, then, is to
fight wrongful commitments, while assisting his clients in the discovery and
acceptance of any treatment needed.
CONCLUSION

Although the Baker Act satisfies most of the constitutional dictates of
procedural due process, amendment and clarification of its provisions are
needed. A jury trial should be afforded at the option of the subject. The extent
of any self-incrimination protection should be specified. The criteria required
for commitment should be dearly stated in the statute. Of course, legal
formalities may have to yield to medical necessities, but it must be remembered
that the major issue is one-of social control.
Even a full range of due process guarantees would be useless if ignored or
misapplied through the languor or ignorance of the attorneys involved. What
the individual caught up in such an action needs most is a competent attorney
who is aware of the role he must play. In some instances the proceedings may
be totally without merit. In others, involuntary hospitalization may be the
only answer to an individual's problems and those of society in general. Yet,
most involuntary hospitalization questions will lie between these two extremes.
Here the attorney's goal should be to match the subject with a treatment program promising him the most progress and providing society the most protection; restraints on personal liberty should be fought if deemed unnecessary.
More labor will be required than has traditionally been the case in commitment actions. But in the broad and somewhat nebulous confines of involuntary
hospitalization of the mentally ill, just as with all the law, it is necessary that
justice be done.
THOMAS J. ELLWANGER

198. Id.
199. See Kumasaka & Stokes, supra note 192, at 201.
200. See Kumasaka, Stokes & Gupta, supra note 196, at 404.
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APPENDIX
STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS

The following are suggested amendments to the Baker Act provisions dealing with involuntary hospitalization of the mentally ill and are designed to implement the recommendations contained in this note.
1. FLA. STAT. §394.463(1) (1973) should be amended to read as follows:
(a) Criteria.- A person may be admitted to a receiving facility on emergency conditions if there is reason to believe that he is mentally ill and because of his illness:
1. There is an imminent danger that he will physically injure himself or others if
allowed to remain at liberty; or
2. He is in need of immediate care and treatment and lacks sufficient capacity to
make a responsible application on his own behalf, and an ex parte order is obtained authorizing the admission.
(c) Emergency Examination.- A patient who is admitted for emergency examination
and treatment by a receiving facility shall be examined by a physician without
unnecessary delay, and may be given such treatment as is indicated by good medical practice. The patient shall have the right, immediately upon admission, to
telephone his guardian or a member of his family or an adult friend and his attorney. If the patient declines to exercise his right, the staff of the receiving facility
shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the patient's guardian or family is
notified of the emergency admission. The patient shall be allowed to confer with
his attorney in private and to meet with his guardian, with adult members of his
family, or with an adult friend at least once during every day of his confinement;
provided that the staff of the receiving facility, in the exercise of sound medical
judgment, may deny this privilege during the first 12 hours of confinement.
II. FLA. STAT. §394.463(2) (1973) should be amended to read as follows:
(a) Criteria.- A person may be admitted to or retained in a receiving facility for
evaluation if there is reason to believe that he is mentally ill and because of his
illness:
1. He is likely to physically injure himself or others if allowed to remain at liberty; or
2. He is in need of care and treatment and lacks sufficient capacity to make a responsible application on his own behalf, provided that a simple finding of
mental illness is not sufficient to invoke this criterion.
(c) Notice; Hearingon Petition.1. The judge shall set a hearing on the petition and shall serve notice of the time
and place of such hearing on the patient, his guardian, if one has previously
been appointed, and the person, if any, having custody and control of the patient. The court shall also notify any other person, including any persons whose
names appear in the patient's court file, that the judge believes has a concern
for the patient's welfare. In the absence of a guardian, two other representatives
for the service of the notice shall be designated by the court, one of whom,
other than the person who filed the petition, shall be selected from the following list in the following order:
a. The patient's spouse;
b. An adult child;
c. A parent;
d. An adult next-of-kin;
e. An adult friend; or
f. A representative of the division of family services.
2. Notice shall be personally delivered to the patient and to the person, if any,
having custody and control of the patient. Notice to other recipients may be
sent by first-class mail. The following items shall be included in the notice:
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a. A copy of the petition;
b. Notice that the patient may waive the hearing by submitting voluntarily to
court-ordered evaluation or to involuntary hospitalization;
c. Notice that the patient is entitled to the assistance of an attorney;
d. Notice that if the patient cannot afford an attorney, he may apply immediately to the court to have one appointed for him. A filled-out petition requesting such an appointment and requiring only the signature of the patient or his guardian or representative shall also be included, along with instructions on how to file it and the address of the court where it must be
filed.
3. The hearing shall be set within five days of the date of mailing the notice. The
court shall grant a continuance upon application by the patient, his attorney,
his guardian, or a representative if such continuance is found necessary to permit preparation for hearing. The judge shall ensure that the patient is effectively represented at the hearing; if the judge entertains any doubts as to the
patient's competency to waive his right to counsel, he shall appoint an attorney
-to represent the patient. The patient shall be required to cooperate with all
medical and other experts before the hearing, but shall not be compelled to
testify at the hearing. Any information disclosed by the patient prior to or
during such a hearing that may subject him to criminal liability shall be inadmissible in any other action.
IIl. FLA. STAT. §394G67 (1973) should be amended to read as follows:
(1) Criteria.-A person may be involuntarily hospitalized if he is mentally ill and
because of his illness:
(a) He is likely to physically injure himself or others if allowed to remain at liberty; or
(b) He is seriously in need of care or treatment and lacks sufficient capacity to
make a responsible application on his own behalf, provided that a simple
finding of mental illness shall not be sufficient to invoke this criterion.
(2) Admission to a Treatment Facility.(a) A patient may be hospitalized in a treatment facility, after notice and hearing,
upon recommendation of the administrator of a receiving facility where the
patient has been admitted for examination or evaluation. When a patient is
not an inpatient in a receiving facility, the administrator of a designated receiving facility may make a recommendation for involuntary hospitalization of
a patient who has been given an examination, evaluation, or treatment by the
staff of the receiving facility or a private physician. The recommendation must
be supported by the opinions of two (2) physicians, who have personally examined the patient within the preceding five days, that the criteria for involuntary hospitalization are met. Such recommendation shall be entered on a
hospitalization certificate, which certificate shall authorize the receiving facility
to retain the patient pending transfer to a treatment facility or completion of
a hearing. The certificate shall be filed in the court of the county where the
patient is located and shall serve as a petition for a hearing regarding involuntary hospitalization. The certificate shall also be filed with the division
of family services.
(b) Notice shall be personally served on the patient and shall be served personally
or by first-class mail on his guardian or representatives. This notice shall inform the patient that involuntary hospitalization proceedings have been commenced against him and shall include the following:
(1) A copy of the hospitalization certificate;
(2) A written notice, in plain and simple language, that the patient or his
guardian or representative may apply at any time for a hearing on the
issue of the patient's need for hospitalization, if he has previously waived
such a hearing,
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(3) A petition for such a hearing, which requires only the signature of the
patient or his guardian or representative for completion, along with written
instructions for filing the petition and the address of the court where the
petition should he filed;
(4) A written notice, in plain and simple language, that the patient may waive
such a hearing by voluntarily agreeing to hospitalization, or with the approval of the court, to some other form of treatment;
(5) A filled-out form indicating such waiver, which requires only the signatures
of the patient and his guardian or a representative for completion, along
with written instructions for filing the form and the address of the court
where the form should be filed;
(6) Notice that the patient is entitled to the assistance of an attorney;
(7) Notice that if the patient cannot afford an attorney, he may apply immediately to the court to have one appointed for him; a filled-out petition
requesting such an appointment and requiring only the signature of the
patient or his guardian or representative shall also be included, along with
instructions as to how to file it and the address of the court where it must
be filed; and
(8) Notice that the patient is entitled, upon request, to have the issue of
whether he meets the criteria for involuntary hospitalization decided by
a jury.
(c) A hearing shall be held within five days of notice unless the patient executes
and files a waiver of the hearing. If the hearing is waived, the court shall order
the patient to be transferred to a treatment facility or, if he is at a treatment
facility, that he be retained there. A patient who waives his hearing may be
immediately transferred to a treatment facility without awaiting a court order
under the authority of the hospitalization certificate. The treatment facility
may retain a patient for a period not to exceed six (6) months from the date
of admission. If continued hospitalization is necessary at the end of that
period, the administrator shall apply to the hearing examiner for an order
authorizing continued hospitalization.
(3) Procedure for a Hearing on Hospitalization.(a) If the patient does not waive his hearing, the judge shall serve notice on the
administrator of the facility in which the patient is hospitalized. The hearing
shall be held within five (5) days, but a continuance may be granted the
patient if necessary to permit preparation for the hearing. The hearing shall
be held in the county in which the patient is hospitalized, but any party may
apply for a change of venue for the convenience of a party or witness or because of the condition of the patient. Venue may be changed within the discretion of the court. One of the physicians who executed the hospitalization
certificate shall be a witness. Both parties shall enjoy full discovery rights
under the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure prior to and during the proceedings, but the court may reduce the time allowed for response to discovery motions upon request by either party. The patient shall be required to cooperate
with all medical and other experts before the hearing, but shall not be compelled to testify at the hearing. Any information disclosed by the patient prior
to or during such a hearing that may subject him to criminal liability shall be
inadmissible in any other action. If the patient, his guardian or representative
so requests, the issue of whether the criteria for involuntary hospitalization are
met may be determined by a civil jury. At the option of the patient, such
hearings may be closed to the public. If the court or a jury concludes that the
patient meets the criteria for involuntary hospitalization, the judge shall, after
considering all possible alternative forms of treatment presented during the
hearing, order the patient to be transferred to or retained in a treatment
facility or to undergo any type of treatment that seems most appropriate on
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an involuntary basis. The order shall adequately document the nature and
extent of the patient's mental illness and shall indicate what alternative forms
of treatment were considered by the court as well as the reasons for their rejection. The judge may adjudicate a person incompetent pursuant to the provisions of this act at the hearing on hospitalization. The treatment facility may
accept and retain a patient admitted involuntarily for a period not to exceed
six (6) months whenever the patient is committed pursuant to a court order
and adequate documentation of the patient's mental illness. Such documentation shall include a psychiatric evaluation and any psychological and social
work evaluations of the patient. If further hospitalization is necessary at the
end of that period, the administrator shall apply to the hearing examiner for
an order authorizing continued hospitalization.
IV. A new section, FLA. STAT. §394.468, should be added, reading as follows: Duties of
Attorney During Involuntary HospitalizationProceedings.(1) An attorney representing a patient during involuntary hospitalization proceedings
under this act shall do his best to see that his client's rights are observed, to ensure that his client's wishes and desires are made known to the court, to work for
the best interests of his client, and to see that justice is done.
(2) To this end the attorney shall, when appropriate, critically evaluate the reports
of the examining psychiatrists; authenticate the facts upon which such reports have
been made; investigate alternative forms of treatment; counsel and confer with
his client; and do everything necessary to ensure that his client receives whatever
treatment he needs with the least possible restrictions on his liberty.
(3) The attorney shall be responsible, in instances where his client is involuntarily
hospitalized, for filing with the court a report of the action he has taken on his
client's behalf. This report shall be made part of the court record of the case.
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